Anti-Dilution
Anti-dilution provisions adjust investor conversion terms when a company raises a down round, protecting preferred investors from valuation drops. Allocators evaluate anti-dilution because it reshapes cap tables during stress, affects founder retention, and influences whether companies can raise clean follow-on capital.
Anti-dilution is a protective mechanism for preferred investors, triggered when a company raises at a lower price per share than prior rounds. The two most common forms are weighted average (more common, less punitive) and full ratchet (rare, highly punitive). In practice, anti-dilution affects dilution allocation, future investor appetite, and employee morale.
From an allocator perspective, anti-dilution is not just a legal clause. It is a stress-regime behavior signal:
- How does the GP act when the market reprices?
- Do they protect economics in ways that preserve long-term company health?
- Or do they impose structures that make the next round impossible?
How allocators define anti-dilution risk drivers
They assess:
- Mechanism: broad-based weighted average vs narrow-based vs full ratchet
- Severity: how punitive the adjustment is to founders/employees
- Interaction with pay-to-play: incentives for insiders to support
- Down-round frequency: portfolio vulnerability to repricing
- Future financing impact: whether cap table becomes unattractive
- Governance: board decisions and restructuring approach
Allocator framing:
“Does protection preserve long-term value—or destroy financability?”
When anti-dilution matters most
- prolonged down markets with repeated repricing
- companies needing bridge rounds or insider-led rescues
- situations with multiple preference layers already in place
How allocators evaluate VC managers
Conviction increases when:
- the manager favors sustainable structures over punitive ones
- down rounds are managed with cap table health in mind
- the GP is transparent on repricing and mark policy
- there is a consistent framework for bridges vs repricing
- the manager has evidence of financing through stress cycles
What slows allocator decision-making
- portfolio companies with messy cap tables and punitive provisions
- GPs that treat anti-dilution as default leverage rather than last resort
- lack of disclosure on structure terms in down rounds
- reluctance to explain how dilution was allocated historically
Common misconceptions
- “Anti-dilution guarantees returns” → it can still fail if exits are weak.
- “Weighted average is harmless” → it can still materially dilute teams.
- “Full ratchet is smart protection” → it can kill the next round.
Key allocator questions
- What anti-dilution terms do you accept by stage?
- How do you balance investor protection with company financability?
- How often did anti-dilution trigger in your history?
- How do you handle insider-led rescues?
- What is your policy for transparent repricing and marking?
Key Takeaways
- Anti-dilution shapes cap tables and financability in stress regimes
- Sustainable structures preserve long-term outcomes better than punitive terms
- Transparency on down-round mechanics drives allocator trust