IBEW Local 325 Pension Fund

IBEW Local 325 Pension Fund

IBEW Local 325 Pension Fund was established in 1963 to provide retirement, disability, and death benefits to eligible members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 325. The plan is a multiemployer defined-benefit fund, meaning contributions come from multiple employers under collective bargaining agreements with the local union. Administration is shared with two sister benefit vehicles — the IBEW Local 325 Annuity Fund and the IBEW Local 325 Joint Trust Fund — which together form the core financial safety net for the local's active and retired electricians across New York's Southern Tier. On the asset-allocation front, the fund emphasizes secondary-market investments, according to Altss research. Known commitments include positions in the ULLICO Real Estate Investment Fund (J for Jobs), a labor-friendly vehicle that channels pension capital into commercial real estate projects employing union workers, and the Income Plus Investment Fund, a fixed-income or credit-oriented pooled vehicle. This dual exposure — real estate alongside a credit sleeve — reflects the classic Taft-Hartley approach: steady yield-generating assets that match long-duration liabilities while supporting union job creation. Geographic focus remains predominantly domestic, consistent with the local nature of the plan's sponsor. The plan's scale — estimated at $61M by Altss — places it in the cohort of smaller multiemployer funds navigating rising PBGC premiums and pressure to consolidate or improve funded status. Recent activity data for the plan is not publicly available, which is typical for Taft-Hartley funds that report primarily through annual Form 5500 filings rather than press releases. The fund does not maintain a standalone investment staff beyond the trustees and their contracted advisors. What sets IBEW Local 325's plan apart is its trustee governance model, a structural feature common to Taft-Hartley funds but one that shapes every allocation decision. Half the board is appointed by the union, half by contributing employers, and neither side can act unilaterally. This parity forces the fund into manager-of-managers postures, heavy reliance on consultants and pooled vehicles, and a bias toward strategies — like the J for Jobs real estate fund — that satisfy both the labor movement's capital stewardship goals and the employers' cost-containment mandates. Succession for trustee seats flows from union elections and employer bargaining, embedding the fund's governance directly in the regional labor relations cycle.