TC Latin America Partners

Investment decisions rest with co-founders Jorge L. Tena and Paul M. Cohn. Both partners sit on every investment committee and take personal responsibility for origination and structuring. The firm operates a flat senior team without a separate investment committee layer, meaning allocators can speak directly to the decision-makers on any given deal.

The firm keeps its AUM private. Altss estimates $500M–$1B in aggregate discretionary capital based on two completed real estate fund vintages, co-investment vehicles, and credit mandates. Published fundraising reporting (PERE News, November 2023) and project-level disclosures support a capital base within that band.

The firm targets the Pacific Alliance countries — Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Mexico and Chile represent the largest allocation by deployed capital, driven by those markets' institutional property sectors and rule-of-law frameworks. The firm maintains offices in Mexico City and Santiago alongside its New York headquarters to stay close to operating partners.

Both. The firm manages discretionary private real estate funds while simultaneously offering institutional investors co-investment rights on individual assets. This dual model lets LPs choose between committing to a diversified fund vehicle or evaluating specific projects on a deal-by-deal basis — a structure designed to address concerns about blind-pool governance in emerging markets.

Confirmed focus areas include logistics and industrial real estate — such as last-mile facilities in Mexico City — alongside build-to-rent residential platforms in Santiago, renewable energy infrastructure, and developer bridge credit. The common thread is supply-constrained real assets in countries where local bank financing remains too short-tenor or conservative to support project economics.

Deal flow comes from the founders' decades-long relationships with regional developers, family-owned property groups, and local financial institutions. The firm does not run a competitive auction process in the traditional sense. Instead, it structures bilateral negotiated transactions with operating partners it has known across multiple cycles — a sourcing model that depends heavily on the personal networks of Tena and Cohn.

The firm sits between a deal-by-deal house and a fund manager. It avoids aggregating capital into large blind pools and then delegating asset-level decisions. Instead, principals retain investment committee authority at both the fund and asset levels, giving them direct visibility into operating partners that a pure gatekeeper structure would not provide. This governance architecture is the core argument the firm makes to institutional allocators concerned about Latin America's information asymmetries.