PREVBOMJESUS

PREVBOMJESUS

The Instituto de Previdência dos Servidores Públicos do Município de Bom Jesus dos Perdões was created in 2008, evolving from a social security and benefits fund established in 1995 for municipal public employees. The fund operates under Brazil's Regime Próprio de Previdência Social (RPPS), the regulatory framework that governs public-sector pension systems at the state and municipal level. Superintendent Pollyanna Ramos Ferreira Zafonatto leads the entity, supported by Financial Director André Luiz Borro Sossolotti and Director Viviane Jesus de Lima. PREVBOMJESUS manages a modest portfolio estimated at roughly $12.6 million (Altss estimate), deploying capital almost entirely within Brazil. Like most RPPS funds, its asset allocation is constrained by Resolução CMN 4,963, which dictates minimum and maximum exposure bands: at least 50% must be held in federal government bonds, with smaller permitted allocations to investment-grade private credit, Brazilian equity funds, and real estate investment trusts. The portfolio is heavily skewed toward fixed-income instruments, principally Tesouro Nacional securities, reflecting both the regulatory mandate and the limited internal investment infrastructure typical of small municipal pension funds. The fund's entire investment portfolio and its headquarters on Rua Joaquim Rodrigues dos Santos in central Bom Jesus dos Perdões remain its sole physical and financial footprint. There are no disclosed direct private equity positions, international allocations, or alternative investment vehicles. The sponsoring entity is the Municipality of Bom Jesus dos Perdões, which carries the ultimate contingent liability for any actuarial shortfall. September 2024: The fund's council approved the annual actuarial valuation report, a standard compliance step for all RPPS funds (per Diário Oficial municipal disclosures, 2024). What distinguishes PREVBOMJESUS structurally is not its size or strategy but its legal architecture: it is one of over 2,100 municipal RPPS funds in Brazil, each ringfenced from the general budget by constitutional mandate. This separation creates a permanent, captive pool of local capital that cannot be diverted by elected officials, yet remains subject to municipal governance — a tension that makes the superintendent's compliance role as critical as any investment decision. Succession risk is concentrated in Zafonatto, who serves at the discretion of the mayor, a political dynamic common to nearly every small-city RPPS in the country.